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JUMPING THE GUN: HEDGE FUNDS IN
SEARCH OF CAPITAL UNDER UCITS IV
INTRODUCTION
An undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities
(UCITS)1 is a regulated investment scheme that complies with the UCITS
Directive (UCITS I), as first enacted by the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1985,2 and its subsequent amendments (the UCITS
Directives).3 In its current form, a UCITS fund4 has been described as a
mutual fund that may employ certain hedge fund strategies.5 UCITS funds
have been called everything from a “poor man’s hedge fund”6 or “hedge
fund lite,”7 to a “badge of quality”8 or even the “gold standard”9 of investor
protection. A UCITS fund offers “the best of both worlds,”10 in providing
hedge fund-like investments and significant regulatory oversight, which has
made them the “primary investment method for retail investors throughout
[Europe].”11 This investment flexibility, accompanied by significant
investor protection, is largely what the drafters of UCITS I envisioned when
they sought to facilitate the cross-border offering of investment funds to
retail investors, develop an integrated and competitive single European
market for investment funds, and establish a uniform level of investor
protection.12

1. Pronounced yoo-sits. Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UCITS (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
2. See Council Directive 85/611, 1985 O.J. (L 375) (EEC) [hereinafter Council Directive
85/611]; Albert Francke, III, Capital Flows between Countries: Reciprocal Arrangements for the
Sale of Shares in Mutual Funds, 1987 COLUM. B. L. REV. 365, 366.
3. The UCITS Directives are “not law applicable to funds, but are part of the treaty apparatus
that constitutes the [European Union (EU)]” whereby Member States are required to implement
these directives at the “national level” within certain parameters. John C. Coates IV, Reforming
the Taxation and Regulation of Mutual Funds: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 1 J.
LEGAL ANAL. 591, 647 n.103 (2009).
4. Although the term “UCITS fund” renders the word “fund” redundant, as the word
“undertaking” implies a certain investment vehicle, the concept is easier to grasp with this
redundancy intact.
5. Dustin Hawks, Note, Long-Term Capital Gain: The Regulatory Landscape for Hedge
Funds after Goldstein, 27 J.L. & COM. 171, 190 (2008).
6. Harriet Agnew, UCITS Interest Grows, ABSOLUTE RETURN + ALPHA, Dec. 15, 2008,
http://www.absolutereturn-alpha.com/Article/2068537/Search/Ucits-Interest-Grows.html?Key
words=UCITS+Interest+Grows.
7. Peter Guest, A Long/Short Answer to Risk Gains Popularity, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 2,
2008, at 16.
8. Agnew, supra note 6.
9. Grellan O’Kelley, UCITS Funds Gain Popularity, Increasingly Employ Hedge Fund
Strategies, FINALTERNATIVES (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.finalternatives.com/node/8961.
10. George Sami, Comment, A Comparative Analysis of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United
States and Europe, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 275, 301 (2009).
11. See Michael J. Schmidt, Note, “Investor Protection” in Europe and the United States:
Impacting the Future of Hedge Funds, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 161, 178 (2007).
12. See Francke, supra note 2, at 366.
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UCITS funds follow the “common minimum standards”13 of the UCITS
Directives and may be “freely marketed on a cross-border basis . . . in
accordance with [a] single passport principle.”14 Legislative enactments
have subsequently amended UCITS I15 through the “Management
Directive”16 and the “Product Directive,”17 which were passed in 2001,18
and together formed UCITS III.19 While UCITS funds utilize a limited set
of eligible assets and strategies like mutual funds,20 subsequent amendments
have permitted UCITS fund managers to employ sophisticated hedge fund
strategies, traditionally outside the purview of mutual funds.21 The most
recent amendment is UCITS IV,22 which was proposed in July 2008 and
will come into effect in mid-2011.23

13. Id. (explaining how Member States may exceed certain threshold requirements set at the
EU level, but may not drop below the threshold). Such minimum “harmonization” requirements
relate to “organization, management, oversight, fund diversification, liquidity, use of leverage, and
eligible assets.” Elizabeth Grace et al., Financial Products and Services Committee, 42 INT’L
LAW. 565, 572 (2008).
14. Jarkko Syyrila, Regulators’ Dilemma: Hedge Funds for the Public?, 18 J. INT’L BANKING
L. & REG. 95, 97 (2003).
15. Paulina Dejmek, The EU Internal Market for Financial Services—A Look at the First
Regulatory Reponses to the Financial Crisis and a View to the Future, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 455,
472 (2009).
16. David Rouch & Katherine Smith, The UCITS Directive and the Single European Funds
Market: A Case Review, 20 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 251, 252 (2005); Council Directive
2001/107, 2002 O.J. (L 41) 20 (EC) [hereinafter Council Directive 2001/107]. The Management
Directive regulates management companies and the simplified prospectus. Council Directive
2001/107, supra.
17. Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 252; Council Directive 2001/108, 2002 O.J. (L 41) 35
(EC) [hereinafter Council Directive 2001/108]. The Product Directive regulates investments by
UCITS funds. Council Directive 2001/108, supra.
18. David A. Kanarek, Directive 2001/107/EC on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and
Administrative Provisions Relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable
Securities (UCITS) with a View to Regulating Management Companies and Simplified
Prospectuses, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 557, 557–58 (2002).
19. Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 252. UCITS II was a reform measure that was never
implemented. See Ashley Kovas, UCITS—Past, Present and Future in a World of Increasing
Product Diversity 11 n.35 (Inst. for Law and Fin., Working Paper No. 44, 2006), available at
http://ilf-frankfurt.org/uploads/media/ILF_WP_044.pdf.
20. Mutual funds “may be more or less restrictive on any given issue” when compared to
UCITS. Patrick J. Paul, Note, The European Community’s UCITS Directive: One Model for
United States Regulatory Change in a Globalized Securities Market, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
61, 86 (1992) (quoting Request for Comments on Reform of the Regulation of Investment
Companies, 55 Fed. Reg. 25,322, 25,326 (June 21, 1990) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270)
(internal quotes omitted)).
21. See Hawks, supra note 5, at 190.
22. Council Directive 2009/65, 2009 O.J. (L 302) 32 (EC) [hereinafter Council Directive
2009/65].
23. Karen L. Anderberg & Jessica Brescia, UCITS and Cross-Border Registration: The
Scheme Has Expanded Beyond Europe, THE HEDGE FUND J., July 2009, available at
http://www.thehedgefundjournal.com/magazine/200907/technical/ucits-and-cross-borderregistration.php.
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UCITS funds have become “[an EU] success story and global brand,”24
accounting for 75% of assets under management within Europe’s fund
industry and over €6 trillion in assets as of the second quarter of 2009.25
Juxtaposed to this success, total global hedge fund assets fell by almost a
third during the second half of 2008,26 due to both investor redemptions and
losses.27 Consequently, hedge fund managers have been in search of a
means to replenish these assets. 28 Many of these managers see a UCITS
“wrapper”29 as a solution.30
The UCITS structure presents an opportunity for hedge funds to solicit
both retail and institutional investors on a cross-border basis, thus
broadening their investor bases and the availability of assets.31 Investors are
likewise seeking out UCITS funds32 because of their reputation for greater
transparency and liquidity than traditional hedge funds,33 which saw
massive redemptions after Bernard Madoff’s $65 billion Ponzi scheme was
brought to light at the end of 2008.34 Additionally, the European
Commission’s (EC’s) initial draft of the Directive on Alternative

24. Dejmek, supra note 15, at 472.
25. EUROPEAN FUND AND ASSET MGMT. ASS’N, TRENDS

IN THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT
FUND INDUSTRY IN THE SECOND QUARTER OF 2009, at 8 (2009), http://www.efama.org/
index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=1033.
26. Richard Ernesti & William Potts, Hedge Funds Turn to the UCITS Kitemark,
HEDGEWEEK (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.hedgeweek.com/2009/09/09/hedge-funds-turn-ucitskitemark.
27. Saijel Kishan, Hedge-Fund Investors Remove Record $152 Billion, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 21,
2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&refer=home&sid=aL3fOSkanqs8;
Tomoko Yamazaki, Hedge Funds Post Record $350 Billion Loss in 2008, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 14,
2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ahzEW2I3AhP8#.
28. See Ernesti & Potts, supra note 26.
29. Bryan Goh, UCITS III: The Opportunity, HEDGED.BIZ (Nov. 9, 2009, 4:35 PM),
http://hedged.biz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=202:ucits-iii-theopportunity&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=63 (explaining how certain hedge funds may be able to
offer the same product in a different “wrapper” by being UCITS compliant).
30. See Ernesti & Potts, supra note 26.
31. See id. One of the first hedge fund managers to launch a UCITS III fund was RWC
Partners in 2006. Steve Johnson, UCITS Pioneer in the Hedge Fund World Warns of Glut, FIN.
TIMES (London), Aug. 23, 2010, at 4.
32. During August 2009, “[i]nflows into UCITS funds amounted to €36 billion.” Joel
Schoppig, UCITS Funds See €36 bn Inflows in a Month, CITYWIRE (Oct. 14, 2009, 1:01 PM),
http://www.citywire.co.uk/selector/-/news/other/content.aspx?ID=361760.
33. See Syyrila, supra note 14, at 97–98. During periods of exceptional market stress, liquidity
may not be a guarantee just by virtue of initially being UCITS compliant. See ADVENT, UCITS
COME TO THE FORE: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE FUNDS INDUSTRY 6 (2010),
available at http://www.advent.com/collateral/wp_ucits.pdf.
34. See Phil Wahba, Hedge Fund Industry Still Feeling Madoff Effect, REUTERS, Mar. 26,
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/PrivateEquityandHedgeFunds09/idUSN2544322520090326
?pageNumber=1 (explaining the negative effect of the Madoff scandal on the hedge fund
industry). But see Stephanie Bodoni, Luxembourg Seeks Closure of Third Madoff-Linked Fund
(Update 2), BLOOMBERG, Mar. 3, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory
&refer=conews&tkr=UBS%3AUS&sid=a6tXFEXnxUww (explaining how Madoff-linked UCITS
funds—not hedge funds—had to be liquidated by Luxembourg’s financial regulator).
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Investment Fund Managers (AIFM Directive)35 may have motivated hedge
fund managers in the EU and the U.S. to seek compliance under UCITS,36
rather than face potentially onerous restrictions.37 That said, it is expected
that 1,000 hedge funds with over $150 billion in assets under
management—including many leading names in the industry38—will have
made the transition to UCITS III-compliance by the end of 2010.39 Some
are even predicting that the current hedge fund industry will “mostly
disappear” with the launch of these “newcits.”40
Despite the recent flood of hedge funds transitioning to the UCITS
brand,41 this conversion may be premature given the realities of UCITS IV,
in its current form.42 Significant up-front and on-going costs will continue
to be associated with running a UCITS IV-compliant fund, despite the
professed benefits.43 Further, the specter of registration under the AIFM
Directive in the EU and hedge fund registration under Dodd-Frank in the
35. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative
Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2004/39/EC and 2009/ . . . /EC, COM
(2009) 207 final (Apr. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Initial AIFM Directive Proposal]. The initial draft of
the AIFM Directive imposed heightened restrictions on alternative funds that are not UCITS
funds, which included hedge funds and private equity funds, while offering some of these funds a
marketing passport throughout Europe. See Simon Thomas & Samuel T. Brooks, European
Alternative Funds: The Alternatives, THE HEDGE FUND LAW REP., June 24, 2009,
http://www.hflawreport.com/issue/72 (follow “European Alternative Funds: The Alternatives”
hyperlink).
36. See Sam Jones, Funds in Effort to Trump Rules with UCITS Roll-Out, FIN. TIMES
(London), Sept. 11, 2009, at 13; Thomas & Brooks, supra note 35; How Asian Funds Will Avoid
EU Directive, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1, 2009, available at http://www.iflr.com/Article/
2282895/How-Asian-funds-will-avoid-EU-directive.html.
37. Some of the restrictions relate to: marketing, capitalization, operations, disclosure and
reporting, investment, valuation protocols, and custody of fund assets. Press Release, Europa,
Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFMs): Frequently Asked Questions (Apr.
29, 2009), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/211&format=
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en [hereinafter Europa Press Release].
38. A non-exhaustive list of hedge fund managers forming UCITS funds includes RAB
Capital, Man Group, Thames River, Marshall Wace, Blackrock, Schroders, Pimco, 3A, Collins
Stewart Fund Management, and HSBC. Steve Johnson, Fund of Funds Dive into Hedgie UCITS
Pool, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 16, 2009, at 3.
39. EUREKAHEDGE, THE EUREKAHEDGE REPORT: SEPTEMBER 2010, at 34 (2010),
http://www.eurekahedge.com/news/EHReport_tracker.asp?File=21092010_EH_Report.pdf.
40. Angus Foote, Corsaletti Sees ‘Newcits’ Bringing Radical Change to Hedge Fund Sector,
CITYWIRE (Dec. 7, 2009), http://www.citywire.co.uk/selector/-/news/selectors-choice/
content.aspx?ID=371477. But see Divya Guha, Analysis Must Change to Deal with ‘Newcits’
Funds, Say Selectors, CITYWIRE (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.citywire.co.uk/selector//news/comment/content.aspx?ID=368669 (explaining that 85% of selectors do not believe
“newcits” funds will replace both traditional long-only and hedge funds).
41. See Michael S. Fischer, The UCITS States of America, HFMWEEK (Oct. 15, 2009),
http://www.hfmweek.com/articles/homepage/comment-and-analysis/262132/the-ucits-states-ofamerica.thtml.
42. See Marco Lamandini, The Commission’s UCITS IV Proposal: Is It Sufficient to Create a
True Single Market Platform? 1–2 (unpublished manuscript) (Sept. 4, 2008), available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=marco_lamandini.
43. See Fischer, supra note 41; Lamandini, supra note 42, at 15.
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U.S. may partially explain why hedge funds have nevertheless sought out
UCITS-compliance.44 While the benefits of UCITS IV are potentially
tangible—as evidenced by this recent interest—UCITS IV must be
amended in order to realistically achieve a fully integrated and efficient
investment fund market in Europe. Part I of this note will examine the
UCITS I and UCITS III regimes45 through the Management and Product
Directives, as they provide the foundation for UCITS IV. Part II will
explore the amendments comprising UCITS IV. Part III will examine the
costs and benefits associated with UCITS-compliance and the influence of
EU and U.S. hedge fund registration proposals on fund managers seeking
UCITS-compliance. Part IV will suggest possible amendments to UCITS
IV so that its benefits are more firmly within reach.
I. QUITE AN UNDERTAKING: UCITS I THROUGH UCITS III
A. UCITS I
UCITS I must first be discussed to provide the necessary groundwork
for understanding UCITS III.46 UCITS I took effect on October 1, 198947 by
establishing “common minimum standards for the authorization and
operation of UCITS” so as to meet the twin goals of ensuring regulatory
harmonization and maintaining adequate investor protection.48 It is
important to emphasize that UCITS I set forth minimum standards, over
which Member States could impose stricter requirements.49 These minimum
standards related to the structure of UCITS funds, the eligible assets in
which UCITS funds could invest, and the extent to which authorization in a
Home Member State could be “passported”50 to a Host Member State.51
However, part of the failure of UCITS I was that individual Member States
did, in fact, impose stricter requirements, which led to “drastically varied”
regulation across Member States, frustrating harmonization.52

44. Simon Gray, Milestones on the Road to Recovery, HEDGEWEEK (Mar. 17, 2009),
http://www.hedgeweek.com/2011/03/17/110206/milestones-road-recovery.
45. As previously mentioned, UCITS II was never implemented and, therefore, will not be
discussed. See Kovas, supra note 19, at 11 n.35.
46. While UCITS I has been subsequently amended by further directives, provisions of UCITS
I that have not been directly revised remain in force.
47. Allan S. Mostoff, Organizing and Marketing Undertaking for Collective Investment in
Transferable Securities (UCITS), 824 PLI/CORP 131, 133–34 (1993).
48. Francke, supra note 2, at 366.
49. Id.
50. Anderberg & Brescia, supra note 23.
51. A UCITS fund is subject to the supervision of the EU Member State in which it is
domiciled—its Home Member State; authorization from that Home Member State is supposed to
be sufficient to obtain authorization in a different Member State, i.e. passporting authorization.
See Lamandini, supra note 42, at 4.
52. See David T. Schubauer, Note, The Inadequacy of the UCITS Directive in a Global
Marketplace, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 323, 324 (2002). Ironically, it was initially
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Although a UCITS fund may pursue a wide range of strategies in
various legal forms,53 all UCITS funds must comply with certain
restrictions.54 Under UCITS I, funds had to be open-ended structures whose
sole object was to invest in transferable securities or other liquid assets.55
Additionally, a UCITS fund had to—and still must—“repurchase or redeem
its units at the request of any unit-holder”56 and publish the price at which
they were redeemed at least twice a month.57 As a result, funds could invest
no more than 10% of their assets in certain illiquid transferable or debt
securities,58 no more than 5% in other UCITS funds, and no assets in nonUCITS.59 Such limits prevented UCITS funds from creating portfolios that
were disproportionately composed of illiquid securities, which would make
on-demand investor redemption difficult.60 UCITS I also imposed
diversification limits,61 as well as borrowing and lending limits.62 However,
these restrictions prevented UCITS fund managers from operating with
sufficient flexibility to seize certain investment opportunities.63
Despite the aforementioned restrictions, the passporting of
authorization is the carrot that justifies the stick. In theory, when a Home
Member State authorizes a UCITS fund to operate in that particular
country, the authorization is valid for all other Member States through a
notification procedure, which allows that UCITS fund to market its shares
to the public in a Host Member State64 after just two months.65 However,
under UCITS I, a Host Member State’s regulator could deny authorization
for cause (subject to judicial review).66 Additionally, as UCITS I did not
cover distribution activities concerning advertisement, listing, and sales
speculated as unlikely that member countries would “ever go beyond the minimum standards of
the directive” due to concerns of competitive advantage. Francke, supra note 2, at 366.
53. UCITS funds may be structured in various legal forms, including common funds managed
by management companies, as unit trusts, or as investment companies. Council Directive 85/611,
supra note 2, art. 1(3).
54. See Council Directive 85/611, supra note 2.
55. Id. art. 19.
56. Id. art. 37(1).
57. Id. art. 34. Although Member States may reduce the frequency of redemptions to once a
month in certain cases. Id.
58. Id. art. 19(2)–(3).
59. Id. art. 24(1)–(2).
60. See Goh, supra note 29.
61. A fund could not invest more than 5% of its assets in a single security. Council Directive
85/611, supra note 2, art. 22(1). This requirement allowed UCITS funds to operate within the
principle of risk spreading. See id. art. 1(3); Schubauer, supra note 52, at 328–29 (explaining that
the 5% limit encourages diversification to limit a fund’s exposure to risk).
62. Funds could not borrow more than 15% of their assets on a temporary basis, and
conversely, could not grant loans or act as guarantor on behalf of third parties. Council Directive
85/611, supra note 2, arts. 36(2), 41(1).
63. See Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 252 (discussing how UCITS III “extended” the
investment powers and versatility of UCITS funds).
64. See Schubauer, supra note 52, at 327–28.
65. Council Directive 85/611, supra note 2, art. 46.
66. See id. art. 51.
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practices,67 individual Member States disjointedly regulated these
activities.68 It is this type of supplemental regulation that prevented full
integration under UCITS I and left only a “small number of funds”69
capable of taking the “cross-border plunge.”70
Tied to the authorization process, UCITS I required comprehensive
disclosure requirements aimed at ensuring investor protection.71 These
disclosure requirements took the form of a prospectus and both annual and
semi-annual reports.72 Under UCITS I, the prospectus specifically required
a minimum set of information “necessary for investors to be able to make
an informed judgement of the investment proposed to them,”73 which had to
be kept up to date.74 In addition to the annual and semi-annual reports, the
prospectus had to be forwarded to a Host Member State for authorization
purposes with an “attestation” of authorization from the Home Member
State and the fund’s organizing documents.75 Although UCITS I laid the
necessary framework for a unified collective investment market and a
uniform level of investor protection, the goal of full integration was slow to
be realized.76
B. UCITS III: MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVE
In order to further promote the cross-border sale of UCITS funds and
modernize UCITS funds’ investment choices, the EC passed the
Management Directive and the Product Directive in 2001.77 The
Management Directive sought to remedy the balkanization of the UCITS
fund industry by: (1) expanding management company activities; (2)
equalizing competition; and (3) requiring the publication of a “simplified
prospectus in addition to the full prospectus.”78 The simplified prospectus
67. See William C. Philbrick, The Task of Regulating Investment Funds in the Formerly
Centrally Planned Economies, 8 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 539, 574 n.157 (1994); Council Directive
85/611, supra note 2, art. 44. Similarly, subsequent directives do not regulate distribution
activities. See Council Directive 2001/107, supra note 16; Council Directive 2007/16, 2007 O.J.
(L 79/11) (EC) [hereinafter Council Directive 2007/16]; Council Directive 2009/65, supra note
22.
68. See Philbrick, supra note 67, at 574.
69. See Schubauer, supra note 52, at 329.
70. Liam Mulloy, Letter to the Editor, Old Taxation Habits Die Hard, FIN. TIMES (London),
Jan. 11, 1991, at 17.
71. See O’Kelley, supra note 9.
72. Council Directive 85/611, supra note 2, art. 27.
73. Id. art. 28(1).
74. Id. art. 30.
75. Id. art. 46.
76. Lamandini, supra note 42, at 5.
77. See Robert W. Helm & Kevin K. Babikian, Creating, Managing and Distributing Offshore
Investment Products: A Legal Perspective, in NUTS AND BOLTS OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 2006:
UNDERSTANDING THE EVOLVING WORLD OF CAPITAL MARKET & INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
PRODUCTS 675, 858–60 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook Ser. No. 8392) (2006).
78. Kanarek, supra note 18, at 558.
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was a major change that aimed to provide the average investor with clear,
concise information79 necessary to make an informed investment decision,
in contrast with the long, confusing prospectus utilized under UCITS I.80
While the simplified prospectus had to be published alongside the full
prospectus81 in the official language of the Host Member State or in a
language approved by the Host Member State,82 fund managers only had to
provide the full prospectus, annual report, and semi-annual report upon
request.83 However, despite the simplified prospectus being a “maximum
harmonisation”84 document, it eventually became apparent that the
simplified prospectus was not simplified enough.85
While the Management Directive arguably made the prospectus more
investor-friendly, it failed to address the sluggish passporting process,
which acted as a barrier to entry for UCITS funds.86 The continued
inefficiency of the passporting process can be partially attributed to the
wide variation of extraneous information required by different Member
States, beyond that specified under UCITS I.87 As a result, the cross-border
registration of UCITS funds remained a costly and time-consuming process,
both in obtaining initial authorization and operating on an ongoing basis.88
With uncertainty as to when a fund would be able to begin operating, many
funds failed to venture out of their Home Member States,89 partly
contributing to a high concentration of UCITS funds in Luxembourg,
Ireland, and the United Kingdom.90

79. The contents of the simplified prospectus included: “a brief presentation of the UCITS,”
“investment information,” economic information regarding taxation, fees and expenses, and
commercial information detailing the manner in which its units can be bought and sold. Council
Directive 2001/107, supra note 16, at Annex 1: Schedule C; Helm & Babikian, supra note 77, at
864.
80. Schubauer, supra note 52, at 332.
81. Council Directive 2001/107, supra note 16, art. 27(1).
82. Id. art. 47.
83. Id. art. 33(1).
84. See Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 258 (explaining how individual Member States
could not impose stricter regulations than those at the EU level).
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.; see also Council Directive 85/611, supra note 2, art. 44.
88. See Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 257 (explaining that the two-month approval period
was a soft-deadline in practice).
89. See Lamandini, supra note 42, at 6.
90. See id. But see Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 259 (explaining how the high
concentration of UCITS funds in certain countries can also be attributed to the fact that
depositaries must be located in the same Member State as the fund appointing it without an
equivalent passport); Lamandini, supra note 42, at 6 (explaining how high concentrations in these
particular countries can be partially attributed to beneficial tax rates and robust domestic retail
markets).
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C. UCITS III: PRODUCT DIRECTIVE
The EC adopted the Product Directive in 200291 to give UCITS funds
investment flexibility to adapt to changing markets while still protecting
investors.92 Though the Product Directive permitted a UCITS fund to
operate with a “higher degree of volatility and complexity” than was
possible under UCITS I, the use of “advanced” investment strategies
allowed these funds to hedge their risks to the benefit of investors.93
Significantly, this directive amended the list of eligible assets94 by allowing
UCITS funds to invest in money market instruments, bank deposits, funds
of funds, standardized financial futures, options traded on regulated
markets,95 and replications of stock index compositions.96 Under this
directive, financial derivatives could be used for investment purposes and
not just for efficient portfolio management, as under UCITS I;97 however,
leverage was capped at 100% of the fund’s value.98 The Product Directive
also increased the limit on investing a fund’s assets within the same body to
20%99 and investments in non-UCITS to 30%.100 Importantly, the directive
also required each manager to employ a “risk-management process.”101
These changes were helpful in updating UCITS funds for the new
century,102 but given the ever-changing nature of the finance industry and
the passage of time,103 the Product Directive inevitably had to be updated.
That update came through the Eligible Assets Directive,104 which
clarified the investment powers described in the Products Directive.105
91. Council Directive 2001/108, supra note 17.
92. See Schubauer, supra note 52, at 330–31.
93. See Simon Dodds, Current Regulatory Issues: Selected Materials, 1580 PLI/CORP 109,
198 (2007).
94. See Council Directive 85/611, supra note 2, art. 19(1).
95. Council Directive 2001/108, supra note 17; Schubauer, supra note 52, at 330–31.
96. Council Directive 2001/108, supra note 17, art. 22(a).
97. Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 254. Additionally, there had to be a process in place for
ensuring the “accurate and independent valuation of OTC derivatives.” Id. at 255.
98. See id. at 255; Council Directive 2001/108, supra note 17, art. 21(3).
99. Council Directive 2001/108, supra note 17, art. 22(1).
100. Id. art. 24(2).
101. Id. art. 21.
102. Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 252.
103. See Dejmek, supra note 15, at 473–74 (hypothesizing that a “new approach” to future
legislation may be worth considering as “an increasing number of funds already fall outside the
scope” of the UCITS framework given the continuing development of financial products and
investment vehicles).
104. Council Directive 2007/16, supra note 67.
105. This directive was the first of the UCITS Directives to be implemented under the
Lamfalussy regime. See Dejmek, supra note 15, at 462–64. The Lamfalussy regime seeks to
“streamline and accelerate” European securities legislation by establishing a committee system
involving the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) and the European Securities
Committee (ESC) to assist in the refinement of legislation through multiple levels of review. See
Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 252; see also Dejmek, supra note 15, at 462–63 (explaining that
the Lamfalussy framework is a four-level structure of legislative review: (1) “basic legislative
framework adopted by []legislators”; (2) “comitology committee” approval by representatives
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Under the Eligible Assets Directive, closed-end funds were considered
eligible assets under certain conditions.106 Asset-backed securities, Euro
Commercial Paper, index-based derivatives, and credit derivatives were
also added.107 The Product Directive, in conjunction with the Eligible
Assets Directive, updated the UCITS regime to remain competitive, yet
certain limitations on products inevitably prevented UCITS from changing
with the times.108
II. ONE SMALL STEP, INSTEAD OF A GIANT LEAP: UCITS IV
A. THE ORIGINS OF UCITS IV
Although UCITS III constituted a significant step forward for the
operation and harmonization of UCITS funds within Europe, it fell short in
a number of ways.109 UCITS III resulted in national markets “dominated”
by local funds without full integration.110 In fact, only three countries—
Luxembourg, Ireland, and the United Kingdom—have been able to market
their funds to at least two-thirds of all Member States, leaving most
countries with limited product choice and a relatively closed national
market.111 Pursuant to these shortcomings, UCITS IV grew out of a number
of evaluations over the efficacy of UCITS III,112 after which the EC
concluded that five areas needed to be addressed in order to improve
UCITS III: (1) notification procedures to the Host Member State’s

from all Member States; (3) CESR supplying technical advice to the EC on securities-related
measures; and (4) monitoring the implementation and enforcement by Member States). However,
it is worth noting that the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) took over CESR’s
responsibilities starting in 2011. Baptiste Aboulian, Funds Seeking Clues on Rule Approach by
ESMA, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 28, 2011, at 9. Nonetheless, this note will continue to refer to
CESR for the sake of consistency.
106. Council Directive 2007/16, supra note 67, art. 2(2); Kovas, supra note 19, at 13–14.
107. ALAIN LECLAIR ET AL., POURING OLD WINE INTO NEW SKINS?: UCITS AND ASSET
MANAGEMENT IN THE EU AFTER MIFID 39 (2008) (citing Council Directive 2007/16, supra note
67).
108. See Dejmek, supra note 15, at 473–74.
109. See Lamandini, supra note 42, at 6.
110. Id. (quoting Friedrich Heinemann, The Benefits of Creating an Integrated EU Market for
Investment Funds 2 (ZEW, Discussion Paper No. 02-27, 2002), available at
http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/24779/1/dp0227.pdf).
111. See id. (quoting Heinemann, supra note 110, at 3–4).
112. The EC presented a White Paper, highlighting the need to boost efficiency and facilitate
market-driven restructuring of the investment fund market through amendments to UCITS III. See
White Paper on Enhancing the Single Market Framework for Investment Funds, COM (2006) 686
final (Nov. 15, 2006); Grace et al., supra note 13, at 574. The White Paper found up to €762
million in potential annual savings, largely through permitting the centralization of management.
Grace et al., supra note 13, at 574. Unresolved questions pertaining to such issues as the “scope of
the ‘management’” company passport, extent of supervision and tax issues, in coordination with
the Internal Market and Services Directorate General of the Commission (DG MARKT), also
provided the groundwork for shaping UCITS IV. Id. at 574–75.
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supervisory authority; (2) fund mergers; (3) asset pooling; (4) management
company passports; and (5) a simplified prospectus.113
UCITS IV was proposed in July 2008114 and approved by the European
Parliament and the European Council almost a year later.115 Member States
are required to adopt UCITS IV at the national level by June 30, 2011,116 in
coordination with further advice from the Committee of European
Securities Regulators (CESR),117 which has begun providing Level 2
technical advice118 on the key changes encompassed in UCITS IV.119
Though the areas of concern were putatively addressed in the five new
chapters comprising UCITS IV,120 it may be too early to determine their
true impact.
B. CHANGES FROM UCITS III TO UCITS IV
1. Notification
An important change within UCITS IV is the further simplification of
the notification procedure that allows a UCITS fund to be marketed in a
Host Member State.121 Under UCITS IV, a UCITS fund seeking to market
its units in another Member State may see faster approval and greater
regulatory harmonization across Member States.122 Unlike UCITS III, a
fund under UCITS IV may simply send notification of its desire to market
its fund in a Host Member State to its Home Member State regulator, who
will then send notification to the Host Member State within ten days.123
Given the wide variety of information requested by Host Member States in
granting authorization under UCITS III,124 costly, time-consuming delays
often extended the stated two-month maximum review period.125 UCITS IV
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, at L42–43.
Dejmek, supra note 15, at 473.
See Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 116.
Id.
See Dejmek, supra note 15, at 473. CESR provides technical advice to the EC on
securities-related measures. Id. at 463. For a detailed description of the Lamfalussy framework,
under which CESR operates, see id. at 462–64.
118. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
119. Letter from Eddy Wymeersch, Chair, Comm. of European Sec. Regulators (CESR), to
Jörgen Holmquist, Chair, European Sec. Comm. (Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.esma.europa.eu/
popup2.php?id=6152.
120. Dejmek, supra note 15, at 473.
121. See Lamandini, supra note 42, at 8.
122. See id. at 9.
123. Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 93. A fund no longer has to send
notification to the Host Member State itself. See id.
124. For example, a fund wishing to passport into Italy had to submit an “extended application
form” and a fund wishing to passport into France had to submit a “French addendum” or “French
marketing memorandum.” Anderberg & Brescia, supra note 23.
125. Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 257. Notification costs trim about 0.25 basis points off
total fund costs with estimated annual costs for continuing notification at €25 million in addition
to upfront costs of €25 million, not including lost opportunity costs due to delays. Impact
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should speed up that process, in that a UCITS fund may begin marketing
immediately once the Home Member State forwards the paperwork to the
Host Member State.126 A Host Member State regulator is no longer able to
review and reject authorization prior to the fund’s actual marketing, but
may only do so ex post.127
In addition to the notification procedure, the package of documents to
be submitted to regulators has also been simplified.128 Under UCITS IV, a
fund need only submit: (1) a notification letter; (2) its charter; (3) its
prospectus; (4) its latest annual and semi-annual report; and (5) its key
investor information document (KII).129 Although much of this information
was previously required under UCITS III, Host Member States were
permitted to—and did—request additional information,130 which is
prohibited under UCITS IV.131 Additionally, Host Member States were able
to impose translation requirements for various documents under UCITS
III,132 imposing additional costs on UCITS funds seeking authorization.133
However, under UCITS IV, only the KII is required to be translated into a
local language, whereas the other documents are now able to be translated
“at the choice” of a UCITS fund into the language of the Host Member
State or “a language customary in the sphere of international finance” like
English.134 These changes may help reduce barriers to entry and compliance
costs,135 while encouraging further harmonization.

Assessment of the Legislative Proposal Amending the UCITS Directive, at 66–67, SEC (2008)
2263 [hereinafter UCITS Impact Assessment].
126. See Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 93. However, Natixis Asset
Management anticipates that “regulators will have ‘wheelbarrows’ full of documents” from large
fund managers upon implementation of UCITS IV in July 2011, which may reduce the efficiency
of the notification procedure for managers. Baptiste Aboulian, ‘Paperwork Surprise in Store for
Regulators’, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 8, 2010, at 15.
127. See RBC DEXIA INVESTOR SERVICES, TOWARDS THE NEXT GENERATION: MOVING FROM
UCITS III TO UCITS IV 17 (May 2009), available at http://www.rbcdexia.com/documents/en/
UCITS/From_UCITS_III_to_IV.pdf [hereinafter RBC DEXIA PRESENTATION].
128. See id.
129. See Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 93.
130. See Anderberg & Brescia, supra note 23.
131. Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 93(6).
132. See Council Directive 2001/107, supra note 16, art. 47.
133. See Karen L. Anderberg, UCITS and the Cross-Border Registration Process, PLC CROSSBORDER HANDBOOK (Mar. 2009), www.practicallaw.com/2-384-8117.
134. Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 94(1)(c).
135. Such ongoing compliance costs include: (1) “filing of periodic sales reports in various
jurisdictions”; (2) complying with “[d]iffering requirements for annual [and extraordinary] general
meetings”; (3) seeking pre-approval of advertising material; (4) complying with varying tax
requirements; and (5) complying with “[v]arious translation and mailing requirements.”
Anderberg & Brescia, supra note 23.
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2. Key Investor Information Document
Under UCITS III, the contents of the “simplified prospectus” were
subject to uneven interpretation and application by Member States,136
sometimes lengthening the level of detail required.137 These supplemental
requirements imposed an estimated €1 million in annual expenses for
translation and printing of investor disclosures for a UCITS fund.138 Though
the situation improved in 2004 when the EC issued a “Recommendation”139
outlining the specific contents of the simplified prospectus, the
recommendation remained largely advisory.140 As a component of the
revised notification process, the KII acts to simplify the disclosure of
pertinent information used by investors.141 The KII is designed to allow
average retail investors to understand the nature and risks of their
investment in a given UCITS fund in their own language and in a nontechnical manner,142 and to allow investors to better compare their options
in a simple, concise format.143 With the implementation of KII, investors
may be able to more easily compare funds and managers may find it easier
to offer a standardized set of disclosures, regardless of the Host Member
States to which they apply.
3. Fund Mergers
Under UCITS III, market inefficiencies in the EU have kept UCITS
funds to about one-fifth the size of similar funds in the U.S.144 Due to the
presence of domestic-only merger regimes and the absence of a crossborder regime, smaller funds have been unable to combine with affiliated
funds in other Member States in order to more efficiently operate and to
take advantage of economies of scale that would reduce the costs passed on
to investors.145 Under UCITS IV, Member States must allow cross-border
mergers, in addition to domestic mergers.146 However, the ability to conduct
136. Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 258.
137. Variation in national requirements allowed some regulators to take a “lax approach” and
others to take a more “risk-averse stance” to UCITS funds seeking authorization, allowing some
regulators to ask for far more detail, thereby defeating the purpose of a “simplified” prospectus.
See LECLAIR ET AL., supra note 107, at 41.
138. UCITS Impact Assessment, supra note 125, at 119.
139. Commission Recommendation 2004/384, 2004 O.J. (L 144) (EC).
140. Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 258.
141. RBC DEXIA PRESENTATION, supra note 127, at 7.
142. Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 78(5). The KII is only allowed to contain
the following: (1) “identification of the UCITS”; (2) “a short description of its investment
objectives and investment policy”; (3) past performance presentation or scenario; (4) “costs and
associated charges”; and (5) the “risk/reward profile of the investment” with applicable warnings.
Id. art. 78(3), (6).
143. Id. art. 78(5).
144. Schmidt, supra note 11, at 177. “At the end of 2006, 54% of EU funds managed less than
€50 million in assets . . . .” UCITS Impact Assessment, supra note 125, at 81.
145. See Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 259.
146. Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 38.
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cross-border mergers is not without restriction.147 Mergers must be
authorized by the merging member’s Home Member State to be effectuated
and a decision must be made by the regulator within twenty days after the
supporting documentation is submitted.148 UCITS IV also provides for an
extensive and exhaustive list of “common draft terms of merger” that must
be included as a part of the aforementioned documentation.149 In fact, a
“vast majority” of UCITS fund managers plan to consolidate
geographically-disperse funds upon implementation of UCITS IV, with
43% of surveyed managers indicating cost savings as the primary reason for
seeking to merge and 24% indicating easier access to markets as their
rationale.150 It has been estimated that allowing mergers could save the
European asset management industry €5 billion a year.151
4. Master-Feeder Structures
UCITS IV has also introduced the ability to pool assets in the form of
master-feeder structures.152 Under UCITS III, the 10% limit on investment
in assets of another UCITS fund prevented the formation of feeder funds.153
However, under UCITS IV a master-feeder structure can now be
established to allow a feeder fund to invest over 85% of its assets in a
master fund, while retaining up to 15% of its assets in liquid assets,
derivatives for hedging purposes, and property essential for operation of the
fund.154 A feeder fund must obtain authorization to operate as such by
submitting documentation to its Home Member State regarding its
relationship with a master fund, the identity of its depositary, a prospectus
and KII, and its investment policy.155 Importantly, despite requiring an
attestation from the feeder fund regarding the legal identity of the master
fund, these two funds may be established in separate Member States on a
147. See id. art. 39–40.
148. Id. art. 39.
149. Id. art. 40. Some of the common draft terms include: type of UCITS involved, “rationale”
for merger, and “expected impact” of merger. Id.
150. Giovanni Legorano, Managers Set to Consolidate in Preparation for UCITS IV, GLOBAL
PENSIONS (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.globalpensions.com/global-pensions/news/1559782
/managers-set-consolidate-preparation-ucits-iv.
151. UCITS Impact Assessment, supra note 125, at 81.
152. Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 58. A master-feeder structure pools
investments from various feeder funds into a master fund in order to produce economies of scale
and particular tax advantages. Effie Vasilopoulos & Katherine Abrat, The Global Dream: The Use
of Master-Feeder Fund Structures by Asian-Based Hedge Fund Managers, EUREKAHEDGE (Nov.
2005), http://www.eurekahedge.com/news/05_nov_sidley_austin_master_feeder_structures.asp.
Local investors invest in a domestic feeder fund that subsequently invests substantially all its
assets in a master fund located elsewhere, which provides beneficial tax effects generally
unavailable otherwise to the local investor. Id.
153. Helm & Babikian, supra note 77, at 861.
154. Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 58.
155. Id. art. 59. The feeder fund is entitled to receive a decision regarding approval within
fifteen days. Id. art. 59(2).
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cross-border basis.156 Efficiency gains could be realized when the masterfeeder structure157 is used in conjunction with the merger provisions.
5. Management Company Passport (MCP)
Although the revised Management Company Passport was almost not
included in UCITS IV158 due to concerns that allowing the passporting of
management and administrative services could “rob the authority
responsible for the fund of the means to monitor and to ensure
compliance,”159 it was nevertheless included as an important, albeit
controversial, part of UCITS IV.160 This “real”161 MCP was designed to
enable greater efficiency and specialization, allowing fund managers to
benefit from economies of scale and cost savings.162 The prior management
passport under UCITS III created inefficiencies as UCITS funds established
in contractual or unit trust form were not able to actually appoint a
management company to oversee a fund in another Member State.163 As a
result, only 10% of management companies actually passported their
services.164 However, this failure has been addressed in UCITS IV.
Under UCITS IV, the management company is only subject to
prudential supervision by its Home Member State,165 despite having
branches or providing services within other Member States.166 A
management company must submit documentation to its Home Member
State regulator in order to establish a branch in a Host Member State and
the Home Member State regulator will forward the paperwork to the Host
Member State regulator within two months, unless it has reason to doubt the

156. See id. art. 59.
157. The master-feeder fund structure could save Europe’s fund industry between €2 billion and
€3 billion a year. Steve Johnson, UCITS IV Offers Huge Savings, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 2,
2010, at 2.
158. See Lamandini, supra note 42, at 10.
159. Grace et al., supra note 13, at 576.
160. See David Adams, UCITS IV-The Next Stage, INT’L CUSTODY & FUND ADMIN. (Sept. 24,
2009), http://icfamagazine.com/public/showPage.html?page=icfa_display_feature&tempPageId=
869229.
161. LECLAIR ET AL., supra note 107, at 3.
162. See Grace et al., supra note 13, at 576.
163. See Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 256. However, UCITS funds organized in corporate
form were able to appoint a management company. See id.
164. UCITS Impact Assessment, supra note 125, at 110.
165. Home Member States are responsible for ensuring that each management company has
sound “administrative and accounting procedures,” internal safeguards and controls for
transactions, and procedures that minimize potential conflicts of interest between the company and
its clients. Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 12(1). Management companies must also
have a minimum of €125,000 in capital, be managed by persons of “sufficiently good repute and
. . . experience” and have their head office and registered office in the same Member State to
become authorized. Id. art. 7(1).
166. See id. art. 10(2).
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adequacy of the company’s administrative structure or financial situation.167
Allowing management companies to consolidate could decrease a fund’s
expenses, as establishing and maintaining separate management companies
in Host Member States may cost a given fund up to €1 million a year.168
III. THE TRUE COST OF COMPLIANCE: UCITS IV AND HEDGE
FUNDS
It would be a mistake to call the improvements from UCITS III to
UCITS IV immaterial or nugatory. However, UCITS IV may still impose
significant costs on hedge funds seeking a UCITS wrapper.169 While it is
too early to tell how effective UCITS IV will be in actually achieving the
original goals of the UCITS Directives,170 certain costs and benefits may
already be apparent. However, the full extent of these costs and benefits
may not be readily apparent to funds seeking compliance under the UCITS
Directives, especially given the specter of hedge fund registration in the
U.S. and the AIFM Directive in the EU seemingly pushing funds to seek
UCITS compliance.171 As such, the rush of hedge funds seeking compliance
under UCITS IV may be premature, absent certain necessary amendments.
A. WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FORMING A UCITS IVCOMPLIANT FUND
The UCITS structure offers several benefits to hedge fund managers
under UCITS IV. Importantly, investors have turned their attention to issues
of liquidity, transparency, and operational control amid recent market
turmoil172 and UCITS IV presents a vehicle where these concerns can be
met through a strongly regulated investment vehicle.173 Though a UCITS
fund is more heavily regulated than the typical hedge fund, a unique benefit
of the UCITS structure is its ability to utilize sophisticated financial
instruments and strategies.174 Additionally, UCITS IV allows hedge fund
managers to gain access to a larger investor base through the use of the

167. See id. art. 17. The Host Member State has an additional two months to consider the
request, allowing the management company to establish a branch after that two month period if no
objection is made. Id. art. 17(6), (7).
168. UCITS Impact Assessment, supra note 125, at 110.
169. Goh, supra note 29.
170. See discussion supra Introduction.
171. See Thiha Tun & Samantha Shankar, Hedge Fund Focus: What Are the Key Issues?,
COMPLINET (July 29, 2009), http://www.herbertsmith.com/NR/rdonlyres/89928414-F367-4E8AAB03-000896A55D96/11894/Hedgefundfocus.pdf.
172. Christopher D. Christian & Stephanie A. Barkus, UCITS: An Opportunity for Hedge Fund
Managers, THE HEDGE FUND LAW REP., July 8, 2009, http://www.hflawreport.com/print/
article/433.
173. Id.
174. See Hawks, supra note 5, at 190.
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passport, reaching both retail and institutional investors,175 and doing so in a
more efficient manner given recent changes.176 Taking advantage of a
UCITS structure also presents an opportunity to take part in an industry that
is poised to expand to €8 trillion by 2012.177 Additionally, the UCITS
“badge” acts as an indication of “regulatory scrutiny and credibility that
engenders investor confidence.”178
However, the UCITS Directives impose significant limitations on
hedge funds as currently formulated; it is not for the “faint-hearted”179 nor a
“silver bullet.”180 Upfront costs for hedge funds seeking UCITS compliance
include authorization paperwork, establishing infrastructure in Europe, and
complying with capital requirements that do not exist in the U.S.181 For
example, compliance with advertising and marketing rules, even after
UCITS IV, may continue to impose high fixed costs upon funds passporting
into other Member States.182 However, independent providers and
investment banks may help alleviate certain startup costs for managers by
offering platforms that reduce the cost and time associated with launching a
fund.183 Nevertheless, ongoing costs include forming efficient compliance
and risk management departments, whose costs will only be able to be

175. See Christian & Barkus, supra note 172. But see Cecilia Valente, Europe Fund Firms to
Oct.
25,
2009,
available
at
Shun
Low-Cost
Centres-Study,
REUTERS,
http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssInvestmentServices/idUSB42497820091026 (explaining how
the mere availability of alternate markets does not mean that each country will be a desirable
location to market a UCITS fund).
176. Though a survey by Ernst & Young reveals that fund managers are looking to UCITS IV
more for business model alignment than as a way to bring operational cost reductions. Press Release, Ernst & Young, Investment Funds Move UCITS IV Focus to Business Model Alignment
and Operational Efficiency (Jan. 12, 2010), http://www.ey.com/RU/en/Newsroom/Newsreleases/Press-Release---2010-01-12. According to BlackRock’s country head for Italy, Andrea
Viganò, investors may not realize the full benefits of UCITS IV for a number of years. Andrew
Fanko, UCITS IV Benefits Years Away: BlackRock, IGNITES EUROPE (Aug. 13, 2010),
http://www.igniteseurope.com/c/116325/11148/ucits_benefits_years_away_blackrock.
177. Christian & Barkus, supra note 172.
178. Paul Allen, Hedge Funds Covet UCITS Badge, WEALTH-BULLETIN (June 15, 2009),
http://www.wealth-bulletin.com/home/content/1054445328. Simon Firth, a partner at Kaye
Scholer LLP, has stated that “a UCITS wrapper dispels in one fell swoop questions about
transparency and lack of regulation that have plagued the offshore model.” Id.
179. Fischer, supra note 41.
180. BlackRock’s Clarvit Blasts UCITS Structure, FINALTERNATIVES (Mar. 4, 2010),
http://www.finalternatives.com/node/11649.
181. Fischer, supra note 41.
182. See Lamandini, supra note 42, at 15.
183. Heather Dale, Hedge Funds Lean on Platforms for UCITS Entry, IGNITES EUROPE (Feb.
22, 2010), http://www.igniteseurope.com/articles/20100222/hedge_funds_lean_platforms_ucits
_entry. Though arranging for platforms risks certain tradeoffs like “exclusivity arrangements,”
loss of control, and associated risk through others operating on the same platform. STRATEGIC
INSIGHT, ALTERNATIVE AND HEDGE FUND UCITS IN THE NEXT DECADE 15 (Nov. 25, 2010),
http://www.alfi.lu/publications-statements/publications/alternative-and-hedge-fund-ucits-nextdecade [hereinafter ALTERNATIVE AND HEDGE FUND UCITS IN THE NEXT DECADE].
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absorbed by larger funds.184 Additionally, on the products side, fund
managers are not permitted to utilize certain familiar strategies or
investments within the UCITS Directives and may subsequently be unable
to effectively operate the fund by shoehorning into a UCITS wrapper.185
Additionally, the fourteen-day maximum redemption period—made
available at the fund’s net asset value—limits a fund from taking positions
in more illiquid assets, which may often be necessary to effectuate a
particular strategy.186 As such, some strategies are more likely to be
repackaged as UCITS than others.187 Overall, these regulatory constraints
are passed on to investors in the form of higher fees188 and may result in a
drop in performance.189 However, it is still too early to tell whether UCITS
funds employing hedge fund strategies currently outperform traditional
hedge funds, especially considering the variety of strategies in existence.190
Regardless, these regulatory constraints have the potential to exert severe
pressure on smaller hedge funds seeking to stay afloat through a UCITS
184. See Fischer, supra note 41. For example, under UCITS IV, funds must demonstrate they
have sufficient risk controls to monitor exposures and must limit risk based on Value at Risk
(VaR) and tracking error. Goh, supra note 29. VaR is generally a measurement of the probability
of losses based on an analysis of historical price “trends and volatilities.” Value at Risk—VaR,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/var.asp (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
Tracking error is the difference between the “price behavior of a position or a portfolio” relative to
a certain benchmark. Tracking Error, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/
trackingerror.asp (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
185. See Philip Haddon, Newcits: What Will Hedge Funds Bring to the Ucits III Space?,
CITYWIRE (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.citywire.co.uk/selector/-/news/new-products/content.aspx
?ID=370488&Page=3 (discussing how some managers may find the transparency and liquidity
restrictions to be incompatible with their particular strategy, while others may find that the limits
on leverage and shorting will prevent them from effectively operating a UCITS fund).
186. See Christian & Barkus, supra note 172.
187. Equity long/short strategies are seen as the most likely to be repackaged as UCITS and
event-driven strategies are seen as the least likely. NOËL AMENC & SAMUEL SENDER, EDHECRISK INSTITUTE, ARE HEDGE-FUND UCITS THE CURE-ALL? 9 (2010), available at
http://www.edhec-risk.com/features/RISKArticle.2010-03-24.5003/attachments/EDHEC%20Risk
%20Publication%20Hedge%20Fund%20UCITS.pdf.
188. Such costs passed on in the form of fees are estimated to be approximately 40–75 basis
points for administrative and platform costs and 60–90 basis points for distribution out of a
standard 2% management charge. Pauline Skypala, Hedge Funds Cashing in on UCITS, FIN.
TIMES (London), Sept. 28, 2009, at 6.
189. According to a survey by KdK Asset Management, more than 90% of fund-of-funds believe UCITS employing hedge fund strategies will have lower returns than their offshore counterparts, with 25% of them expecting the performance gap to be as big as three percentage points a
year. Steve Johnson, UCITS Hedge Vehicles to Flood Sector, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 11, 2010,
at 1. Nick Sketch, senior investment director at Rensburg Sheppards Investment Management,
likened the fallacy that a hedge fund strategy can successfully be modified to fit into a UCITS
fund to “‘having a horse with four legs that runs at 40 miles per hour, and saying that when you
back-test that horse with three legs it can run at 30 miles per hour.’” Access and Assurance:
Bridging Asset Classes: Derivatives Structuring, THE BANKER, July 1, 2010, available at 2010
WLNR 13453004 (citation omitted).
190. See Nils S. Tuchschmid et al., Will Alternative Ucits Ever Be Loved Enough to Replace
Hedge Funds? 30 (Working Paper 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1686055 (explaining that there is no conclusive evidence that more traditional hedge funds as a group outperform
UCITS employing hedge fund strategies as a group).
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platform.191 Thus, while UCITS IV presents a salient opportunity for hedge
funds, up-front and ongoing costs may be too high to justify such a
conversion at the moment without certain amendments that would alleviate
these costs.
B. EXTERNAL FORCES CAUSING A FALSE START
1. Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act in the
U.S.
While the cost-benefit analysis will be different for each fund in
determining whether to establish a UCITS IV-compliant fund, certain
external forces have the potential to skew certain managers’ perceptions of
the appropriateness of establishing that fund. One such external force is
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, also known as the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act
of 2010 (the Registration Act).192 While nearly 55% of U.S. based hedge
funds had registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
by the beginning of 2009,193 the Registration Act requires an investment
adviser of hedge funds to register with the SEC under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act) if it has more than $150 million in
assets under management.194 In addition to complying with the Advisers
Act, the Registration Act requires registered advisers to disclose a variety of
information to the SEC,195 maintain books and records,196 and be subject to
systemic risk supervision197 and possible examinations.198 Granted,
impending registration adds a layer of regulation previously unknown to
unregistered investment advisers of hedge funds, but the disclosure-centric

191. Chris Newlands, Fundwatch: Hedge Funds Take a Hit in UCITS Drive, ALLBUSINESS
(Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.allbusiness.com/banking-finance/financial-markets-investingfunds/13082868-1.html.
192. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, §401,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
193. Press Release, Hedge Fund Research, Inc., Hedge Fund Research Releases Data on
Number of Hedge Fund Firms Registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 2,
2009), https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/pdf/pr_20090202.pdf.
194. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §408 (adding subsection
(m) to Section 203 of the Advisers Act, which provides an exemption from registration for
advisers of private funds who manage less than $150 million in assets under management in the
U.S.).
195. See id. §404(3) (amending Section 204 of the Advisers Act). The Act requires the following information to be disclosed: (1) assets under management; (2) leverage usage; (3) counterparty
credit risk exposure; (4) type of assets held; (5) valuation and trading practices; (6) any side arrangements; (7) trading and investment positions; and (8) “such other information as the [SEC]
. . . determines is necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors or for the assessment of systemic risk.” Id.
196. Id. §404(4).
197. Id. §404(7).
198. Id. §404(6).
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requirements within the Registration Act will not necessarily alter a
particular fund’s overall operation and strategy—it will only require that
certain information is reported.199
Accordingly, investment advisers seeking to avoid registration in the
U.S. may not find protection under a UCITS wrapper. As previously
mentioned, UCITS funds are highly liquid, invest in a defined set of assets,
avoid significant amounts of leverage, and do not engage in short selling.200
Alternatively, a hedge fund that does not have formal diversification rules
or limits on its range of investments is able to restrict redemption periods
and may engage in strategies employing significant amounts of leverage
and short selling.201 The Registration Act promises to monitor these
activities more closely, but it does not restrict these activities as in the
UCITS Directives.202 Thus, despite the threat of registration in the U.S., a
UCITS-compliant fund may not make sense as an alternative for managers
seeking a less burdensome regulatory regime under UCITS IV.
2. Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive in the EU
More critical to the decision of hedge funds seeking a UCITS wrapper
is the potential scope and effect of the AIFM Directive,203 which was passed
in late 2010.204 While many hedge fund managers may have rightly been
anxious about the potential effects of the initial AIFM Directive,205 the final
version has potentially allayed fears206 and rendered the decision to launch a
UCITS-compliant fund less compelling as a means of regulatory avoidance.
The AIFM Directive, as first proposed on April 29, 2009,207 sought to
199. See Memorandum from Patton Boggs LLP on the Status of Proposed Legislation for
Increased Regulation of Investment Advisers and the Private Funds They Manage (Sept. 2009),
http://www.pattonboggs.com/news/detail.aspx?news=941 (follow “Click here for the full PDF”
hyperlink). For the same reason that many fund managers chose to remain registered after the SEC
attempted to require managers to register in 2004, instituting mandated compliance programs and
other requirements pursuant to the Advisers Act and under the Registration Act help “enhance
credibility and confidence” and attract investors. Janaya Moscony & José Santiago, SEC
Registration for Private Fund Investment Advisers—It’s Not as Scary as You Think,
HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, Oct. 2, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 19481053.
200. See Syyrila, supra note 14, at 97.
201. See id.
202. See Council Directive 85/611, supra note 2; Council Directive 2001/108, supra note 17;
Council Directive 2007/16, supra note 67.
203. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative
Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC, COD (2009)
64 (Oct. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Final AIFM Directive Proposal].
204. Mirzha de Manuel, Why Passport Flexibility Comes at a Price, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec.
13, 2010, at 6.
205. A March 2010 survey by the EDHEC Risk Institute reveals that over 60% of fund managers believe that the AIFM Directive leads to uncertainty about the distribution of funds and 92%
of fund managers “‘see a trend towards packaging [hedge fund] strategies as UCITS.’” AMENC &
SENDER, supra note 187, at 8–9.
206. See ALTERNATIVE AND HEDGE FUND UCITS IN THE NEXT DECADE, supra note 183, at 7.
207. Europa Press Release, supra note 37.
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regulate any alternative investment fund that was not a UCITS fund208 with
more than €100 million in assets under management.209 Significantly, under
the initial draft, funds based outside the EU could not market their funds in
Europe for at least three years after implementation of the AIFM Directive,
unless they were able to obtain authorization from a particular Member
State and were based in a country with equivalent standards of prudential
and ongoing regulation.210 This could have closed off U.S. based hedge
funds from European investors due to non-equivalent standards.
Additionally, the initial draft of the AIFM Directive imposed wide-ranging
restrictions on the operation of funds.211 With these restrictions, it is easy to
see why many hedge fund managers have sought cover under a UCITS
wrapper.
However, the initial draft of the AIFM Directive met fierce opposition
from the alternative investment industry and was heavily criticized in a
report commissioned by the European Parliament, calling the directive
“vague, sweeping and inadequate,” “poorly-constructed, ill-focused and
premature,” and “protectionist.”212 This criticism was so cutting as to force
certain compromises in subsequent redrafts.213 However, while the sharpest
edges of the initial draft have been sanded down,214 and additional

208. Thomas & Brooks, supra note 35.
209. See Initial AIFM Directive Proposal, supra note 35, at 5–6; Richard Horowitz, Future
Regulation of Private Funds: How the Draft EU Directive & US Legislative Proposals Compare,
THE HEDGE FUND LAW REP., May 7, 2009, http://www.hflawreport.com/print/article/350.
210. See Initial AIFM Directive Proposal, supra note 35, at 7; James Farrugia, The AIFM
Directive
and
Third
Country
Managers,
HEDGEWEEK
(Sept.
1,
2009),
http://www.hedgeweek.com/2009/09/01/aifm-directive-and-third-country-managers.
211. Some of the operational restrictions include: minimum capital requirements, an additional
capital charge on assets under management above a certain threshold, an independent depositary,
preapproval for any delegation, comprehensive disclosures to investors and regulators, caps on
leverage, and restrictions on short selling. See Horowitz, supra note 209; see also Initial AIFM
Directive Proposal, supra note 35.
212. Quick Impact Assessment on a Directive concerning Alternative Investment Fund
Managers and Amending Directives 2004/39/EC and 2009/ . . . /EC at 6–7, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE
429.974 (2009), available at http://www.europolitique.info/pdf/gratuit_fr/260342-fr.pdf.
213. Both the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee and the
Economic and Financial Affairs Council passed conflicting compromise texts in May 2010. James
(May
18,
2010),
Phillipps,
EU
Approves
AIFM
Directive,
CITYWIRE
http://www.citywire.co.uk/new-model-adviser/eu-approves-aifm-directive/a400553.
214. See Memorandum from Mark V. Karmer, et al., Partner at Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt &
Mosle LLP, on AIFM Directive (Dec. 2010), http://www.curtis.com/sitecontent.cfm?pageID=
21&itemID=506 [hereinafter Memorandum from Karmer et al.] (explaining how certain
compromises were made “in the relatively watered-down depositary liability regime and the
planned introduction . . . of a ‘passport’ for the marketing of non-EU funds within the [EU]”). The
vague, initial reciprocity requirements were also amended in favor of bilateral agreements on the
exchange of information, not being a non-cooperating country in terms of terrorist financing and
money laundering, and compliance with certain model tax convention standards. Final AIFM
Directive Proposal, supra note 203, art. 35. The national private placement regime will also
remain in force until it is phased out in 2018, despite non-EU firms only being able to apply for
the passport in 2015. See id. art. 63(1), 63bis, 63ter.
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provisions have been added,215 certain aspects of the initial proposal still
remain.216 Even though many hedge funds were rightly concerned about the
deleterious effects of the AIFM Directive as initially drafted and factored
this into their decision to pursue a UCITS wrapper, recent amendments
have rendered those decisions to be somewhat short-sighted217 relative to
the true costs of compliance under UCITS IV as it stands.218
IV. OVERCOMING OBSTACLES: REALIZING THE GOALS OF
UCITS
While the current influx of hedge funds converting to UCITS funds
may be somewhat premature considering the relative costs and the concerns
over regulation, certain amendments to UCITS IV could rationalize this
decision for many managers. Such amendments include further
simplification and clarification of the notification procedures, greater
product flexibility, depositary passporting, tax harmonization, and less
restrictive distribution channels.219 With these amendments, many hedge
fund managers and UCITS fund managers will better be able to justify the
decision to become UCITS-compliant on a cross-border basis, due to a
more fully integrated investment fund market. While all Member States are
required to implement UCITS IV on a national basis by June 30, 2011,220
certain changes to UCITS IV should still be made; the industry “can’t
afford to wait for UCITS V”221 which will likely be a priority for the EC
starting in 2011 and will focus on investor protection, rather than efficiency
of the European fund market, and could take up to five years.222
A. STREAMLINE NOTIFICATION AND IMPROVE THE PASSPORT
Although UCITS IV has improved investor disclosure requirements and
streamlined the notification process to potentially allow for greater
215. See Memorandum from Karmer et al., supra note 214 (explaining that the additional requirements concerned “managers’ future reporting and disclosure towards regulators and investors, their minimum capitalization, remuneration, risk management, liquidity, use of leverage on
the fund level, conflicts of interest, fund control positions in portfolio companies, fund portfolio
valuation, and marketing/fundraising”).
216. See id. (explaining that “the adopted text maintains the core features of the original
proposal aimed at achieving better investor protection, enhanced transparency, and effective
prudential oversight of systemic risks”).
217. See id.
218. See Fischer, supra note 41.
219. These amendments address both “policy induced” (tax, passporting and products) and
“natural” obstacles (distribution channels). See Heinemann, supra note 110, at 10 (explaining how
“policy induced” obstacles may be eliminated through legislation, yet “natural” obstacles are a
result of “consumer preferences” or “the inherent characteristics of [the] market”).
220. Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 116(1).
221. UCITS IV: The Next Generation, FUNDAMENTALS (Sept. 29, 2008),
http://fundamentalsmagazine.com/news/353/ucits-iv-next-generation.
222. Baptiste Aboulian, Commission Makes UCITS V a Priority, IGNITES EUROPE (Apr. 8,
2010), http://www.igniteseurope.com/articles/20100408/commission_makes_ucits_priority.
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integration of the investment fund market in Europe, these improvements
may fall short when translated from paper to practice. While the KII has the
opportunity to simplify the cross-border marketing of a UCITS fund to
investors in various Member States, the efficacy of this document heavily
relies on all Member States agreeing on common definitions and risk
classifications to make the comparison of funds relevant and meaningful.223
If the definitions and risk classifications are overly broad, the KII will likely
be no better than UCITS III’s “simplified prospectus” as individual
Member States will have leeway to interpret the provisions and apply them
as they see fit. Thus, the definitions and classifications should be drafted
narrowly so as to avoid a multiplicity of interpretations.224
UCITS IV has arguably simplified the notification process by providing
for immediate marketing within a Host Member State and only ex post
review. However, providing notification of a fund’s desire to operate in a
Host Member State should be as simple as sending that notification directly
to that state if the fund has already been authorized to operate in its Home
Member State.225 Additionally, the ability of a UCITS fund to immediately
operate in a Host Member State directly collides with the ability of that
state to impose local marketing rules on foreign UCITS funds, as
mandatory compliance with local marketing laws may make immediate
operation less of a reality.226 As partial evidence of this skepticism, in a
survey of asset managers, 10% cite the main drawback of UCITS IV as the
concern that the MCP, the KII, and the notification process will not be as
effective as advertised.227 Furthermore, many fund managers who have not
acquired or inherited a “‘web of duplicate management companies and
similar fund ranges’” will not likely even take advantage of an MCP228 in
place of focusing on maintaining a local point of contact and local expertise
for clients.229 As a result, an additional 10% of respondents cite the main
drawback of UCITS IV as an increase in compliance costs and red tape,
especially for managers who wish to remain domestic-based, yet need to

223. See RBC DEXIA PRESENTATION, supra note 127, at 11.
224. A multitude of interpretations would significantly delay the implementation of timesensitive decisions concerning investment strategy or investment focus, as a material change in a
fund’s business must be disclosed across all documents and relayed to every applicable Host
Member State. See Anderberg & Brescia, supra note 23.
225. See RBC DEXIA PRESENTATION, supra note 127, at 15.
226. See Anderberg & Brescia, supra note 23.
227. KPMG & RBC DEXIA, UCITS IV: WHICH BUSINESS MODEL FOR TOMORROW? 37 (2009),
http://www.rbcdexia.com/documents/EN/Misc/UCITS%20IV%20report.pdf [hereinafter KPMG
& RBC DEXIA REPORT].
228. See Chris Newlands, No “Appetite” for UCITS IV Company Passport, IGNITES EUROPE
(Nov. 27, 2009), http://www.igniteseurope.com/articles/print/20091127/appetite_ucits_company
_passport (explaining how even organizations with duplicate management companies and similar
fund ranges may see a greater and quicker impact from fund mergers, rather than the MCP).
229. See id. (explaining how a client may be alienated by the sheer distance from a manager
operating in a different country, leading to a proximity problem and a risk of diminishing quality).
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implement a risk management process.230 Without resolving the conflict
between local marketing rules and the ex post review procedure, addressing
disclosure clarification issues, and accounting for purely locally based
funds, UCITS IV may not reach its full potential.
B. UPDATING THE PRODUCTS DIRECTIVE
With the focus of UCITS IV primarily on the consolidation and
simplification of UCITS funds throughout Europe, this Directive currently
fails to address the need for further refinements concerning product
regulation. As financial products and investment vehicles continue to
evolve, a number of funds run the risk of falling outside the scope of the
UCITS Directives.231 The truth is that for a number of hedge funds, UCITS
compliance will be a sizable step backward in sophistication.232 For
example, short sales continue to be prohibited,233 despite being considered a
legitimate investment strategy.234 There may also be a case for allowing
investments in commodities and “microfinance,” which are presently
excluded, despite their widespread use.235 Additionally, the explosive
growth in the variety of UCITS funds offered has incited calls for clearer
labeling of UCITS products.236 Currently, all UCITS funds are considered
non-complex investments under the Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive (MiFID), which allows managers to market a fund without
assessing the knowledge or experience of an investor in this “executiononly” service.237 However, the EC is holding a public consultation on
whether to bifurcate UCITS funds into complex and non-complex
investments, relegating managers overseeing complex investments to
sophisticated investors with “knowledge and experience” only or
230. KPMG & RBC DEXIA REPORT, supra note 227, at 38.
231. See Dejmek, supra note 15, at 473–74. But see Etienne Carmon, The Missing Link to
UCITS Success, FT MANDATE (Feb. 1, 2007), http://www.ftmandate.com/news/fullstory.php/
aid/1352/The_missing_link_to_UCITS_success.html (explaining that extending the scope of
eligible assets has the potential to harm the reputation of UCITS).
232. See Haddon, supra note 185.
233. Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 254.
234. Anuj Gangahar & Deborah Brewster, Hedging Industry Resents Taking Blame for Turmoil,
FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 20, 2008, at 4. But see James Smith, Hedge Funds Hope to Re-Build
Confidence with UCITS Funds, CITYWIRE (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.citywire.co.uk/
professional/-/news/income/content.aspx?ID=369520&Page=1 (explaining how certain UK hedge
funds may find the restriction on short selling less of an issue as many use contracts for difference
(CFDs) to replicate a shorting strategy).
235. See KPMG & RBC DEXIA REPORT, supra note 227, at 39.
236. See Baptiste Aboulian, Euroview: Call for Clear Labeling on UCITS Products, FT
ADVISER (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.ftadviser.com/InvestmentAdviser/Investments/Comment/
article/20091019/050bb2de-b7da-11de-9bbb-00144f2af8e8/Euroview-Call-for-clear-labelling-onUCITS-products.jsp.
237. Commission Public Consultation on Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), at 54 (Dec. 8, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
consultations/docs/2010/mifid/consultation_paper_en.pdf.
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eliminating the “execution only” regime entirely.238 CESR did not support
changing the UCITS categorization—though it abstained from taking any
position in its MiFID advice to the EC—and neither did many within the
industry.239 While protecting retail investors from mistakenly investing in a
UCITS fund utilizing hedge fund strategies makes sense in the abstract, the
proposed KII may already provide an effective tool for disclosing the
relative risk levels of a particular fund. Imposing an appropriateness test on
a subcategory of UCITS funds may only lead investors to confuse
complexity and risk.240 In addition to more flexible investment strategies, a
clearer description of certain risk factors will make it easier for managers to
improve disclosures to investors and help investors be more aware of the
risks inherent in each investment regardless of the Member State.
C. DEPOSITARY PASSPORTING
Depositaries work alongside UCITS funds and their management
companies to ensure the safekeeping of assets.241 The UCITS Directives
have largely been silent on the role of depositaries; however, a depositary is
required to have its registered office or branch in the same Member State as
its fund and does not have a passporting feature associated with it,242 thus
fragmenting the funds associated with these depositaries. A passport for
depositaries would go a long way in decreasing costs, facilitating fund
mergers, and ensuring harmonization across borders.243 However, a large
majority of depositaries and custodians also find their roles to be
“inappropriately defined.”244 At the beginning of 2009, the EC requested
advice from CESR on potential improvements to depositaries in crossborder management situations and CESR delivered its advice later that
year.245 CESR proposed revising the definition of “safekeeping” by
focusing on the “overall control of assets and segregation,” including the
possibility of delegating custody to sub-custodians, while clarifying the

238. Id. at 54–56. The Chairman of the European Fund and Asset Management Association,
Jean-Baptiste de Franssu, believes newcits are “a traffic accident waiting to happen” given that
UCITS were never intended for sophisticated investors. Pauline Skypala, De Franssu Warns on
Newcits, FIN. TIMES (London), July 19, 2010, at 2. There is additionally some concern that these
newcits are pushing the boundaries of UCITS into dangerous territory. See David Ricketts, PwC
Identifies Newcits Hazards, IGNITES EUROPE (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.igniteseurope.com/
articles/20100315/identifies_newcits_hazards.
239. Baptiste Aboulian, Fight Likely Over Plan for ‘Classes’ of UCITS, FIN. TIMES (London),
Dec. 13, 2010, at 12.
240. Id.
241. Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 259.
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. AMENC & SENDER, supra note 187, at 10.
245. See Letter from Eddy Wymeersch, Chair, Comm. of European Sec. Regulators (CESR), to
Charlie McCreevy, Comm’r, European Comm’n (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.cesr-eu.org/
popup2.php?id=6063.
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depositary’s liability and strengthening due diligence requirements with
regard to the “selection, appointment, and periodic review of the subcustodian.”246 Pursuant to CESR’s advice, the EC has begun consultation on
eventually incorporating depositary liability247 and passporting248 into
UCITS V.249 However, as important as the depositary function is, a survey
of asset managers shows that only 3% consider the lack of a depositary
passport the main drawback of UCITS IV.250 Regardless, improvements in
the depositary function will better allow managers to establish funds on a
cross-border basis.
D. TAX HARMONIZATION
While allowing fund mergers to occur on a cross-border basis is an
important step in creating a unified European investment fund market, tax
issues must first be clarified and resolved before funds can realistically
consider cross-border mergers.251 Currently, “[s]ignificant discriminatory
tax barriers” exist relating to the sale of foreign UCITS funds in each
Member State’s market.252 Importantly, CESR has warned the EC of the
potential tax obstacles to fund mergers within UCITS IV.253 In fact, the tax
situation is so vital to a fully harmonized investment fund market that
UCITS IV may be a “dead directive” in Italy, unless its tax regime is
revised.254 On the other hand, more tax efficient destinations, such as
Luxembourg and Ireland, have disproportionately high concentrations of
UCITS funds domiciled there, leading to further balkanization.255 One
246. Id.
247. Working Document of the Commission Services on Consultation Paper on the UCITS
Depositary Function and on the UCITS Managers’ Remuneration, at 13–14 (Dec. 14, 2010),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/ucits/consultation_paper
_en.pdf.
248. Id. at 16–17.
249. Adam Lewis, EC Planning UCITS V to Apply ‘Madoff Lessons’, FUNDSTRATEGY (May
17, 2010), http://www.fundstrategy.co.uk/markets/eurozone/ec-planning-ucits-v-to-apply-madofflessons/1011766.article.
250. KPMG & RBC DEXIA REPORT, supra note 227, at 37.
251. See RBC DEXIA PRESENTATION, supra note 127, at 19. For example, “a cross-border
merger [could] trigger[] tax charges . . . even though investors will not actually realise [sic]
investments at the point a merger occurs. . . . [and] it is also possible that investors will be subject
to higher tax rates.” Adams, supra note 160.
252. See Heinemann, supra note 110, at 11 (summarizing several Member States’
discriminatory tax measures).
253. Baptiste Aboulian, CESR Call to Clarify Merger Tax Obstacles, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct.
5, 2009, at 19.
254. David Ricketts, “A Dead Directive”: UCITS IV in Italy, IGNITES EUROPE (Jan. 20, 2009),
http://www.assogestioni.it/index.cfm/3,144,4837/ignites_europe_ucitsiv.pdf. Domestic funds in
Italy are required to pay taxes on behalf of investors whether or not capital gains are realized,
while elsewhere capital gains taxes are paid only when a fund is sold. Id.
255. For example, UCITS funds established in Luxembourg and Dublin are able to roll up
income and gains with no tax, instead of having to distribute profits to avoid taxation. Carmon,
supra note 231.
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suggestion has been to treat cross-border fund mergers under UCITS IV as
non-taxable events.256 Significantly, a survey of asset managers suggests
that the absence of a tax framework is the biggest drawback of UCITS IV,
with 45% of respondents indicating concern over management company
taxation, fund taxation, and investor taxation.257 Additionally, allowance for
cross-border mergers under UCITS IV may actually cause Home Member
States to further complicate their domestic merger regulations in response,
being unable to independently regulate on a cross-border basis, which will
likely have an effect on the effectiveness of integration.258 For example,
certain Member States currently tax fund mergers at the investor level,
which leads to situations where investors pay taxes on unrealized gains.259
Additionally, under the laws of certain Member States, managing a fund on
a cross-border basis could lead to a fund being a tax resident in the
management company’s Home Member State, instead of uniformly being
taxable where the fund is established.260 Further, certain Member States
levy withholding taxes on cross-border dividend distributions to foreign
feeders or impose a tax on redemptions in the country where their master
fund is located, rather than having flows and transactions between master
and feeder funds be tax neutral.261 Without a harmonized tax regime across
the EU, much of UCITS IV will not be able to be effectively implemented
or utilized by the investment fund industry and full integration will not be
realized.
E. EXPANSION OF DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS
An additional obstacle to a fully integrated investment fund market is
existing distribution channels where banks and other distributors often steer
customers toward “in-house” funds rather than third party funds.262 The lack
of investor choice that results from this type of favoritism and prevents
foreign funds from reaching local investors must be addressed.263 Solving
256. Aboulian, supra note 253.
257. See KPMG & RBC DEXIA REPORT, supra note 227, at 37. But see Baptiste Aboulian,
Tricky Jumping UCITS IV Tax Hurdle, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 7, 2009, at 20 (explaining how
tax harmonization may be politically infeasible given the widely divergent tax structures of funds
across Europe).
258. See RBC DEXIA PRESENTATION, supra note 127, at 15.
259. EFAMA & KPMG, ANALYSIS OF THE TAX IMPLICATIONS OF UCITS IV 4–5 (2010),
http://www.kpmg.com/IM/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/FINAL_EFAM
A%20_Analysis_of_the_Tax_implications_of_UCITSIV.pdf.
260. Id. at 5.
261. Id. at 6.
262. See Lamandini, supra note 42, at 15–16. A substantial majority of fund managers believe
that “there are problems with the distribution of hedge funds to retail investors.” AMENC &
SENDER, supra note 187, at 10.
263. Lamandini, supra note 42, at 16. But see Heinemann, supra note 110, at 12 (explaining
that it is doubtful that mere consumer preferences greatly contribute to the fragmentation of the
European market, as fund performance matters more than the fund’s domicile to investors).
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the conflict of interest problem could be a great boon to investors as 60% of
the cost of fund management is tied to the “distribution process and
network.”264 Cutting distribution costs would allow more funds to access
foreign markets and retail investors and it would increase the integration of
the investment fund market. However, it has been estimated by members of
the industry that cross-border fund distribution is likely to continue to be
“difficult and inefficient for at least another five years,” despite the EC’s
recent attempts at correcting the problem.265 Despite the large number of
launches of UCITS funds employing hedge fund strategies, there is scant
evidence that these vehicles are being fully funded due to skepticism by
distributors as to the funds’ abilities to comply with UCITS III and their
general lack of experience with a retail client base.266 Without addressing
the collusive manner in which funds are distributed, full integration simply
will not be possible.267
CONCLUSION
While the ink on UCITS IV is hardly dry, certain improvements need to
be made in order to fully realize a truly integrated and efficient investment
fund market in the EU. Addressing tax harmonization, fixing the current
distribution scheme, adding depositary passporting, and improving both the
notification and product restrictions would go a long way in making full
and efficient integration a reality. However, this may be easier said than
done. Part of the success of the UCITS Directives has been its “slow,
carefully planned development.”268 Thus, while each of this note’s
proposals aim to improve upon UCITS IV, funds may continue to push
forward and take the risk that UCITS IV will look as good in practice as it
does on paper. Granted, funds already employing significant amounts of
leverage, engaging in short selling, and investing in illiquid securities may
264. Adams, supra note 160.
265. Sophia Grene, UCITS IV ‘No Magic Bullet’ for Distribution, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 5,
2009, at 2.
266. See Heather Dale, Newcits Managers Naïve, Say Distributors, IGNITES EUROPE (Feb. 23,
2010),
http://www.igniteseurope.com/articles/20100223/newcits_managers_naive_distributors.
Additionally, a Preqin survey reveals that as of March 2010, only 8% of European institutional
investors have invested in UCITS employing hedge fund strategies, despite many considering an
allocation. Christine Williamson, UCITS on Investors’ Minds, But Not in Many Portfolios,
PENSIONS&INVESTMENTS (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.pionline.com/article/20100311/DAILY
REG/100319969#ixzz18h40p86d. However, some investment banks have designed platforms to
assist hedge fund managers in their distribution. Dale, supra. Still, just 50 funds captured 90% of
net flows in 2010, demonstrating the concentration of investment in managers with a proven track
record in the UCITS realm. ALTERNATIVE AND HEDGE FUND UCITS IN THE NEXT DECADE, supra
note 183, at 5.
267. However, certain market trends may indirectly work to alleviate the bias. See Heinemann,
supra note 110, at 12 (explaining that the “restructuring of distribution channels toward direct
internet sales and independent fund shops,” as well as the implementation of cross-border mergers
and increasing investor sophistication will all work towards eliminating fund product bias).
268. Adams, supra note 160.
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find compliance prohibitively burdensome, but the benefits are potentially
tangible—namely passportability and access to retail investors. Though the
AIFM Directive in the EU and the Registration Act in the U.S. promise
more bark than bite for investment funds, heightened regulation appears to
be here to stay—at least in the near term—forcing managers to consider all
available options. Accordingly, while the cost of UCITS IV may prevent
some funds from seeking a UCITS wrapper, certain amendments could
make compliance possible for many more.
Kevin R. Johannsen
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